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What’s already known about this topic?
	Emerging research indicates that strong just-world believers report more pain and display more pain behaviour following an experienced injustice
What does this study add?





Background: A growing field of investigation into social justice cognitions and pain suggests perceived injustice has a negative impact on pain, but little is known about individual variation in the impact of a perceived injustice. One published study found that individuals with a strong rather than a weak just-world belief reported greater pain from the cold pressor task after experiencing a perceived injustice, but an overt measure of perceived unfairness is needed to investigate this relationship. 
Methods: Following the completion of just-world belief and state anxiety scales and the cold pressor task, 114 healthy participants were interviewed about either an experienced injustice or the characteristics of their home, before repeating the cold pressor task. Pain and anxiety measures were completed following each cold pressor task. 
Results: Opposing the hypotheses, no differences were found on pain and anxiety between the two interview conditions and individuals with a strong just-world belief did not report higher pain and anxiety levels following a recalled injustice. However, within the recalled injustice condition, unfairness ratings were associated with significantly increased pain and anxiety. 
Conclusions: Recalled personal injustice unrelated to one’s current pain experience had a negative impact on pain and anxiety associated with the cold pressor task. These findings indicate that intervention development should be cognisant of the role of everyday injustices and not just those related to pain, on the pain experience. 





Research into the impact of social justice cognitions on the experience of chronic pain has established that perceived injustice, defined as the severity/irreparability of loss and blame/unfairness related to one’s pain condition, negatively affects physical and psychological health outcomes (Sullivan et al., 2008). However, little is known about who is most likely to be adversely affected by a perceived injustice, and thus most in need of intervention. Factors including the gravity of injustice, availability of coping resources and the extent to which one cares about justice might be important (McParland and Eccleston, 2013). 
Research indicates that strong just-world believers, who need to believe we live in a world in which everyone gets what they deserve (Lerner, 1980), are more concerned about justice and are thus likely to be threatened by undeserved suffering, the central ingredient of perceived injustice. However, the just-world belief serves important functions and so is not easily forsaken by a perceived injustice. The belief ascribes meaning to the world (Lerner, 1980) and protects well-being (Dalbert, 2001), acting as a buffer against the adverse effects of pain among support group and pain clinic attendees (McParland and Knussen, 2010; McParland et al., 2014), and among males exposed to the cold pressor task (McParland et al., 2013), although the opposite effect was found for females in this latter study. This gender difference may be attributable to variations in task appraisal that threatened the belief for females, with deleterious consequences. This interpretation suggests that the just-world belief is a partially experiential construct (Dalbert, 2009); it is a coping resource that is threatened by circumstances that are perceived as severely unjust. 
	Trost et al. (2014) conducted the only published investigation of the relationship between the just-world belief and perceived injustice in pain, finding greater reports of pain and more pain behaviour displayed among strong rather than weak just-world believers undergoing the cold pressor task after exposure to injustice (experimenter negligence) than before it. It was concluded that strong just-world believers care more about injustice and this adversely affects their experience of pain. However, as was acknowledged by the authors, perceived injustice was not overtly measured in this study. 




Ethical approval for the study was granted by the School of Health and Life Sciences at Glasgow Caledonian University. Exclusion criteria were self-reports of medical conditions and the use of analgesic medication, recreational drugs or alcohol in the previous 12 hours. In total 114 healthy students from the university were recruited into the study, through convenience sampling. Fifty-eight participants (51%) were male; most participants were of White British origin and all were aged between 18-40 years (M = 22; SD = 3.61). Written was obtained from each individual before participation. 

Pain Induction 
A circulating cold water bath Jeiotech model VTRC 620 (Seoul, Republic of Korea) with a temperature set at 5 ˚C was used to induce acute pain. As in our previous investigation (McParland et al., 2013), pain threshold and tolerance were measured by a stop watch in seconds. 

Self-Report Measures
Belief in a just world
The Personal Belief in a Just World Scale (Personal BJW: Dalbert, 1999) was used to measure the belief in the justness of personal life events. Level of agreement with seven justice-related statements was indicated on a 1-6 scale and scores were summed to provide a total Personal BJW score. The six-item General Belief in a Just World Scale (General BJW: Dalbert, Montada and Schmitt, 1987) operates on a similar basis and was used to measure the justness of events in the world. Both scales have been shown to be internally reliable in previous similar pain research (McParland et al., 2013), and are valid measures (Dalbert, 1999; Loo, 2002).

State anxiety
The short-form State Anxiety Inventory (SF-SAI) (Marteau and Bekker, 1992) was used to measure current emotional tension before and after pain induction. The scale contains six items e.g. “I feel calm”, “I am tense”, each item scored on a four-point Likert scale. Scores (some reverse-coded) are summed to obtain a total state anxiety score. The scale has demonstrated strong internal reliability (Tluczek, Henriques and Brown, 2009) and validity (Marteau and Bekker, 1992).

Pain report
The Short-Form McGill Pain Questionnaire (SF-MPQ) (Melzack, 1987) was used to measure pain at the point of the maximum tolerance. The 11 sensory and four affective descriptors are each scored on a 0-3 scale and are individually summed to provide a measure of the quality of pain. The 100 mm visual analogue scale (VAS) ranges from ‘no pain’ to ‘worst possible pain’ and provides a measure of pain intensity. The SF-MPQ has demonstrated strong internal reliability and validity (Grafton, Foster and Wright, 2005; Wright, Asmundson and McCreary, 2001).

Injustice (Experimental) Induction Interview
The injustice interview schedule was developed based on previous research (Lipkus, 1992; Levenson et al., 1991; Vrana et al., 2009). Due attention was given to ensure that key elements of injustice were included i.e. undeserved suffering, emotional impact, and blame (Hafer and Begue, 2005). Participants were asked to describe an event that had happened to them that they felt was very unfair, including when the incident took place; their feelings towards the incident at the time and current feelings; any action taken in response to it and whether the injustice was resolved. Probing questions were used to focus on the details of the incident. Blame towards the transgressor in the incident was rated on a scale with endpoints 0 = “no blame” and 10 = “a lot of blame”. The unfairness of the incident was rated on a scale with endpoints 1 = “a little” and 10 = “very much”. Current anger towards the injustice was rated on a scale with endpoints 0 = “no anger” and 10 = “extreme anger”. The level of difficulty in recalling an injustice was reported on a scale with endpoints 0 = “not at all” and 10 = “very much”.

Neutral (Control) Interview
A control condition interview was designed to focus participants on a neutral, emotionally benign topic, specifically the details of their home. Participants were questioned on the type of home they occupied; how long they had lived there; were instructed to detail the inside layout of their home and were asked whether they lived with anyone and to provide a description of their garden, if relevant. Probing questions were used to encourage detailed responses.

Procedure
First Cold Pressor Immersion
Data collection took place in a university laboratory. Following screening, each participant completed a personal history measure (including sex, height, weight and age), the Personal and General BJW Scales and the SF-SAI. Following the same procedure as in our previous research (McParland et al., 2013), hand temperature was initially set at around 32˚C, before each participant was instructed on the cold pressor procedure. Specifically, participants were instructed to place their non dominant hand into the water, above the wrist with the palm facing upwards, and to report when they first noticed pain (indicating threshold) and then when it was too painful for them to continue (indicating tolerance) before withdrawing their hand from the water. Immediately following the procedure, participants completed the SF-MPQ for the first time and the SF-SAI for a second time. Post experimental recovery of hand temperature was then achieved using a warm water bath. 

Experimental versus control condition
Following the first cold pressor immersion, each participant was interviewed. In the experimental condition approval was sought for the interview to be audio-recorded. Each participant was given as much time as needed to recall an injustice (taking approximately up to one minute), before being questioned about the reported injustice and rating blame, injustice and current anger in relation to the injustice. In the control condition, participants were instructed to focus on the details of their home, before being questioned about the characteristics of their home. The average duration of each interview was approximately 5 minutes. 

Second Cold Pressor Immersion
Immediately following the interview, participants completed the cold pressor task for a second time following the same sample procedure as Time 1, where hand temperature was regulated before the cold pressor task, pain threshold and tolerance times were recorded during the task and following the task the SF-MPQ was completed for a second time and the SF-SAI was completed for the third time, before post experimental recovery of hand temperature was achieved.  

Data analysis
Descriptive statistics were calculated and corrections applied for variables that were not normally distributed. Age and the cold pressor task pain measures were positively skewed and square-root transformations were applied. Bivariate relationships among the variables and differences between conditions and sex were examined using correlation and t-tests respectively. The hypotheses were examined using repeated measures analyses of covariance (ANCOVA): the factors were condition (injustice or control) and sex, and the covariates were age, and General or Personal BJW (for Hypothesis 2), and Unfairness or Blame (for Hypothesis 3).  Significant interactions were probed with simple slope analysis (Aitken and West, 1991; Holmbeck, 2002). 

Results
Descriptive statistics and characteristics of sample	
The descriptive statistics for the sample by condition are presented in Table 1. The experimental condition included 64 participants, split equally between males and females.  The control condition included 50 participants, 52% of whom were male (n = 26). The two conditions did not differ significantly on height, weight or the baseline measures of just world beliefs or state anxiety. However, they differed significantly on age, such that those in the control condition tended to be older than those in the experimental condition: t (77.22) = -4.18, p < 0.001. The two conditions did not differ on the CPT measures of pain or on SF-MPQ Sensory or VAS scores. SF-MPQ Affective scores were highly skewed towards the lower end, such that over 60% of participants at both time points gained scores of ≤ 1:  further, the measure of internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) was low at Time 1 (0.59), particularly for those in the Injustice condition (0.44). These findings suggested that the affective ratings were not relevant for most participants and the decision was made to omit the Affective scores from further analysis. 
					INSERT TABLE 1
Perceived injustice condition descriptive statistics
Two co-authors (JMcP and JM) categorised the reported instances of injustice following specific guidelines (Lupfer et al., 2000; Mikula, Petri and Tanzer, 1990) and achieved a 92% level of agreement on the categories. Disagreements were resolved through discussion. The emergent themes were: “procedural injustice” (n = 23 (36%) e.g. incompetence of professionals or unfair academic rules); “interpersonal injustice” (n= 23, (36%) e.g. being treated badly by family or friends) or “distributive injustice” (n= 15 (23%) e.g. increased workload in workplace). Three reported injustices (5%) reported injustices were non-specific. The mean blame, unfairness and current anger scores are reported in Table 1. The timing of the injustices ranged from one day ago to 16 years ago. Twenty nine (45%) of the participants reported that their injustice had not been resolved. These individuals reported higher blame (7.32 versus 5.24: t(61) = -3.04, p = 0.003) and current anger scores (4.29 versus 1.71: t(52) = -3.90, p < 0.001) than those who had their injustice resolved. There were no differences between the two justice resolution groups in their general and personal BJW scores, or in their ratings of unfairness. The mean difficulty of injustice recall score was 5.21 (SD = 3.43; range = 0-10). 
INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3
Relationships among the variables
Tables 2 and 3 show the correlations among the variables at Time 1 and at Time 2. Higher personal BJW scores were associated with lower anxiety scores at baseline, but not at Time 1 or Time 2. Higher general BJW scores were associated with higher Sensory scores (i.e. greater reported pain) at Time 1, but not at Time 2.  Tolerance, threshold and sensitivity were all significantly related to one another, as would be expected, and those with longer tolerance and sensitivity times reported less pain and anxiety at Time 1 and Time 2.  Reported pain (SF-MPQ Sensory and VAS) were related to each other at both time points.  At Time 1, anxiety was not related to either measure of reported pain; however, at Time 2, those reporting more pain also reported more anxiety.

Pain and anxiety reported over time by condition
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the difference between Time 1 and Time 2 reported pain (Sensory and VAS scores) and anxiety would be greater for those in the experimental condition than for those in the control condition. This hypothesis was examined using three repeated measures ANCOVAs with condition and sex as between-subjects factors. Age was entered as a covariate. 
There were no indications that differences between either of the Time 1 and Time 2 measures of reported pain varied according to experimental condition: Sensory, F (1, 109) = 0.01, p = 0.925, η2 < 0.001; VAS, F (1, 109) = 0.99, p = 0.321, η2 = 0.009. Similarly, although state anxiety increased over time between Time 1 and Time 2, there were no indications of differences between the conditions on changes in anxiety: F (1, 109) = 1.65, p = 0.201, η2 = 0.015. There was therefore no support for the first hypothesis.

The role of the belief in a just world
The next set of analyses was conducted to determine whether differences between Time 1 and Time 2 reported pain and anxiety measures were explained by either personal or general BJW scores, and whether there were indications of interactions between BJW scores and condition, or BJW scores and sex. As before, this hypothesis was examined using a series of repeated measures ANCOVAs with condition and sex as between-subjects factors. Covariates included age and either personal or general BJW scores. 
	The difference between Time 1 and Time 2 Sensory scores was found to be related to personal BJW scores: F (1, 107) = 7.13, p = 0.009, η2 = 0.062. Overall, the higher the personal BJW scores, the smaller the difference between Time 1 and Time 2 Sensory scores. This was not moderated by experimental condition: F (1, 107) = 0.13, p = 0.724, η2 = 0.001. However, it was moderated by sex: F (1, 107) = 4.94, p = 0.028, η2 = 0.044. This was probed with a simple slope analysis using regression, controlling for condition and age (Aiken and West, 1991; Holmbeck, 2002). For females, a negative relationship was found between the personal BJW and the difference between Time 2 and Time 1 Sensory scores (B = -0.41, SE B = 0.13, b = -0.30, t = -3.28, p = 0.001), such that higher personal BJW scores were associated with a smaller difference between Time 1 and Time 2 Sensory scores. No such relationship was found for males (B = -0.02, SE B = 0.12, b = -0.02, t = -0.19, p = 0.849). The finding was therefore contrary to the hypothesis. 
	Change in VAS scores over time was not related to either personal or general BJW scores.  There was an indication that sex moderated the relationship between personal BJW and change in VAS scores between T1 and T2: F (1, 107) = 4.55, p = 0.035, η2 = 0.041.  However, this effect was not upheld by the results of a simple slope analysis, in that the relationships between personal BJW and the difference in VAS scores were not significant for either males or females. 
	When change between Time 1 and Time 2 anxiety scores was considered, no significant relationships were found with either personal or general BJW.  However, when change between baseline and Time 2 was considered, a marginal relationship was found with personal BJW: F (1, 107) = 4.02, p = 0.048, η2 = 0.036.  This relationship was not significantly moderated by condition or sex.  The direction of the relationship was such that higher personal BJW scores were related to a greater increase in anxiety between baseline and Time 2. 

Perceived injustice
The third hypothesis was that, within the experimental condition, differences between Time 1 and Time 2 self-reported pain and anxiety would be related to self-reported unfairness, anger and blame of the recalled injustice. As before, a series of repeated measures ANCOVAs was conducted. Sex was the between-subjects factor. Age was entered as a covariate, followed by unfairness or blame. Anger was excluded because the distribution was highly skewed: 30% of the participants in the experimental group (n = 19) reported no anger at all. It should be noted that unfairness and blame were not significantly correlated with any Time 1 or Time 2 measures of self-reported pain or pain experience.
Perceived unfairness was significantly related to differences between Time 1 and Time 2 Sensory scores and state anxiety scores: Sensory, F (1, 60) = 10.11, p = 0.002, η2 < 0.144; Anxiety, F (1, 60) = 6.69, p = 0.012, η2 < 0.100.  No significant relationships were found between unfairness and differences between Time 1 and Time 2 VAS scores or baseline and Time 2 anxiety. With regard to differences between Time 1 and Time 2 Sensory and anxiety scores, the greater the perceived unfairness of the recalled event, the greater the increase from Time 1 to Time 2 in reported pain or anxiety. These relationships remained significant when blame was entered into the equations and blame did not make significant contributions to the explanation of variance in any analysis. Similarly, the relationships remained significant when BJW scores were entered into the equations, and there were no indications of significant interactions between unfairness and BJW scores.  

Discussion
This study investigated the effects of a recalled injustice on pain and anxiety in relation to personal and general just-world beliefs among individuals who had completed the cold pressor task. Opposing the first hypothesis, differences in pain and anxiety scores across cold pressor tasks did not vary as a function of interview condition, and there was no moderating role of just-world beliefs in this investigation: i.e. those with strong just-world beliefs did not report more pain and anxiety following the recall of an injustice than before it, as was expected (hypothesis 2). However, for females, stronger personal just-world beliefs were associated with smaller increases (or decreases) in sensory pain after the second cold pressor immersion, an effect that was not observed for males. Again, this was contrary to the hypothesis. A plausible explanation for this difference lies in the strategies males and females use to cope with pain. Research suggests that males and females may believe in a just world for different reasons: the two groups may differ in their views about what is just in the world and this may serve different purposes and be related to different outcomes for males and females (Benson, 1992). In the present study, the personal BJW may have served as a personal resource among females exposed to the cold pressor task. These findings appear to be inconsistent with the pattern of findings in our previous investigation where the just-world belief was associated with positive outcomes for males but negative outcomes for females exposed to the cold pressor task (McParland et al., 2013). One explanation for this difference lies in the difference between the analyses: The dependent variable in the previous study was the absolute measure of reported pain (McParland et al., 2013),  while in the current study, the dependent variable was, in effect, the difference between Time 2 and Time 1 measures of reported pain. It can be speculated that the personal BJW was associated with a smaller change in reported pain for females in the present study because there was a habituation effect of the second immersion that was less psychologically stressful than the first immersion and was thus less threatening to the personal just-world belief. Regardless of these differences, both studies found gender differences in relation to just-world beliefs and future research should be cognisant of this.
	The third hypothesis was partially supported. Perceived unfairness ratings associated with the recall and reporting of an injustice were associated with significantly higher sensory pain scores and a higher self-report of anxiety following the cold pressor task among those who had recalled an injustice. These findings are consistent with clinical research that has found perceived injustice to be associated with increased pain severity and negative emotion (Sullivan et al., 2014). Although blame is a core part of the judgement of injustice (Mikula, 1993), in the present study unfairness ratings were associated more with the pain experience than ratings of blame. Unfairness ratings did not differ between those whose injustice had and had not resolved, but blame scores were significantly higher amongst those with an unresolved injustice. Future research should investigate the independent effects of unfairness and blame on pain outcomes, particularly in a clinical context where they may have implications for the treatment of pain. 
Numerous mechanisms through which perceived injustice might impact upon the experience of pain have been proposed. In the present study, it is possible that the recall of an injustice focussed attention on the injustice and led to rumination, involving focussed attention on the symptoms of one’s distress (Sullivan et al., 2014). This, in turn, may have led to an increase in self-reported pain and anxiety. In support of this idea, pain catastrophising (an exaggerated mental set consisting of elements including rumination) has been associated with perceived injustice (Sullivan et al., 2011), suggesting the possibility that justice-related appraisals lead individuals to ruminate or focus on their suffering, with adverse consequences. 
	That there were few significant effects of the just-world belief in the present study is inconsistent with the pattern of results reported by Trost et al (2014) who found that individuals with a strong just-world belief reported more pain and displayed more pain behaviour following an injustice incident, than before it. Just-World Theory (Lerner, 1980) states that the just-world belief will be threatened by undeserved injustice; specifically, the greater the discrepancy between an unjust event and one’s just-world belief, the more threatened the belief will be by the perceived injustice, and that the emotional arousal wrought by the injustice will drive attempts to defend the belief in a just world (Hafer and Begue, 2005). One possible explanation why the present study findings did not align with this position is that the recalled injustices were not sufficiently emotionally arousing to engage or threaten the just-world belief. The low current anger score is consistent with this idea. Anger is central to the experience of injustice (e.g. Mikula, Scherer and Athenstaedt, 1998), and has been found to mediate the relationship between perceived injustice and pain severity (Scott et al., 2013), suggesting that anger arising from perceptions of injustice can explain the effects of injustice on the pain experience. The low anger score is likely to have been partly attributable to the fact that most participants reported that their injustice had been resolved and thus reported less current anger than those who had an unresolved injustice. That some injustice was resolved in the present study is a flaw in the study design. However, the findings do highlight the resolution of injustice as an important variable for future research in this area to consider.
	One reason why these and not other injustices were recalled in the study may be explained by the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), a mental shortcut that relies on immediate examples that come to mind when considering a specific topic. This heuristic operates on the notion that what is recalled must be more important than alternatives that were not recalled. That the unfairness ratings were associated with increased self-reported pain and anxiety suggests that the recalled injustices were significant to the participants. However, given that some participants had difficulty recalling an injustice it is likely that the participants did not typically view themselves as victims of injustice. 
A key limitation of the study is that the sample consisted of young students who are likely to have had a more limited range of life experience than older individuals whose pain experience may be affected by different perceived injustices. This limits the generalisation of the findings. Additionally, the injustice and control condition interviews were not fully matched, i.e. only the experimental interviews were audio-recoded (something that may have exacerbated the reported injustices), and ratings of blame, anger and unfairness were not recorded in the control condition, making it difficult to ascribe these ratings to the reported injustices. 
Overall, although there were no effects of just-world beliefs in the present study, and although the findings need to be replicated in other, clinical samples, the findings contribute to current literature which has focussed exclusively on the role of current pain-related injustice on the experience of pain, as they suggest that recalling and reporting a personally-experienced injustice that is unrelated to the experience of pain (whether resolved or not) can impact upon the current experience of pain. Intervention development in this area should be cognisant of the potential effects of these wider, every day life injustices, whether past or present, on one’s experience of pain. 

Authorship
Dr Joanna McParland was involved in the conception and design of the study, the acquisition of the data and in the interpretation of the data and writing the drafts and final version of the paper. 
Dr Christina Knussen was involved in the analysis and interpretation of the data, and writing the drafts and final version of the paper.
Dr Jennifer Murray was involved in the design of the study and in the interpretation of the data and writing the drafts and final version of the paper.







1.	Aiken, LS., West, S.G.(1991). Multiple Regression: Testing and Interpreting Interactions (Thousand Oaks, Sage).

2.	Benson, D.E. (1992).Why do people believe in a just world? Testing explanations. Soc Spectrum12,73-104.

3.	Dalbert, C. (1999). The world is more just for me than generally: About the personal belief in a just world’s validity. Soc Jus Res,12,79-98.

4.	Dalbert, C (2001). The Justice Motive as a Personal Resource: Dealing with Challenges and Critical Life Events (New York, Plenum Press).

5.	Dalbert, C. (2009). Belief in a just world. In Handbook of Individual Differences in Social Behavior, M.R. Leary, R.H. Hoyle, eds. (New York, Guilford Publications) pp 288-297

6.	Dalbert, C, Montada, L., Schmitt, M: (1987). Glaube an eine gerechte welt als motiv: validierungskorrelate zweier skalen. Psychol Beitr29,596-615.

7.	Grafton, K.V., Foster, N.E., Wright, C.C: (2005). Test-retest reliability of the Short-Form McGill Pain Questionnaire: assessment of intraclass correlation coefficients and limits of agreement in patients with osteoarthritis. Clin J Pain21,73-82.

8.	Hafer, C., Begue, L (2005). Experimental research on just world theory: Problems, developments, and future challenges. Psychol Bull131,128-167.
9.	Holmbeck, G.N (2002). Post-hoc probing of significant moderational and meditational effects in studies of pediatric populations. J Ped Psychol27,87-96.

10. Lerner, M.J: (1980). The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion (New York, Plenum Press).

11. Levenson, R.W., Carstensen, L.L., Friesen, W.V., Ekmanm P: (1991). Emotion, physiology, and expression in old age. Psychol Aging6,28-35.

12. Lipkus, I.M. (1992). A heuristic model to explain perception of unjust events. Soc Jus Res5,359-384.

13. Loo, R: (2002). A psychometric and cross-national examination of a belief in a just world scale. J Appl Soc Psychol32,1396-1406.

14. Lupfer, M.B., Weeks, K.P., Doan, K.A., Houston, D.A (2000). Folk conceptions of fairness and unfairness. Eur J Soc Psychol30,405-428.

15. Marteau, T.M., Bekker, H. (1992). The development of a six-item short-form of the state scale of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). Br J Clin Psychol31,301-306. 

16. McParland, J., Knussen, C. (2010). Just world beliefs moderate the relationship of pain intensity and disability with psychological distress in chronic pain support group members. Eur J Pain,14,71-76.

17. McParland, J., Knussen, C., Lawrie, J., Brodie, E. (2013). An experimental investigation of the role of perceived justice in acute pain. Eur J Pain17,412-422.

18. McParland, J., Knussen, C., Serpell, M., Eccleston, C. (2014). The function of just-world beliefs in a sample of pain clinic attendees. J Pain Manage7.263-271.

19. McParland, J., Eccleston, C. (2013). “It’s not fair”: Social justice appraisals in the context of chronic pain. Cur Dir Psychol Sci22,484-489.

20. Melzack, R. (1087).  The short form McGill pain questionnaire. Pain30,191-197.

21. Mikula, G. (1993). On the experience of injustice. Eur Rev Soc Psychol4,223-244.

22. Mikula, G., Petri, B., Tanzer, N. (1990). What people regard as unjust: Types and structures of everyday experiences of injustice. Eur J Soc Psychol20,133-149.

23. Mikula, G., Scherer, K.R., Athenstaedt, U. (1998). The role of injustice in the elicitation of differential emotional reactions. Pers Soc Psychol Bull24,769-783.

24. Scott, W., Tros,t Z., Bernier, E., Sullivan, M.J.L. (2013). Anger differentially mediates the relationship between perceived injustice and chronic pain outcomes. Pain154,1691-1698.

25. Sullivan, M.J.L., Adams, H., Martel, M.O., Scott, W., Wideman, T. (2011). Catastrophising and perceived injustice. Spine3,S244-249.

26. Sullivan, M.J.L., Yakobov, E., Scot,t W., Tait ,R. (2014). Perceived injustice and adverse recovery outcomes. Psychol Inj Law7,325-334.

27. Tluczek, A., Henriques, J.B., Brown, R.L. (2009). Support for the reliability and validity of a six-item state anxiety scale derived from the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. J Nurs Meas 17,19-28.

28. Trost, Z., Scott ,W., Lange, J.M., Manganelli, L., Bernier, E., Sullivan, M.J.L. (2013). An experimental investigation of the effect of a justice violation on pain experience and expression among individuals with high and low just world beliefs. Eur J Pain17,412-422.

29. Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: a heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cog Psychol5,207-232.

30. Vrana, S.R., Hughes, J.W., Dennis, M.F., Calhoun, P.W., Beckham, J.C. (2009). Effects of post-traumatic stress disorder status and covert hostility on cardiovascular responses to relived anger in women with and without PTSD. Biol Psychol82,274-280.





Table 1. Characteristics of sample and descriptive statistics
		Injustice condition (n = 64)		Control condition (n = 50)		Total			
		M (SD)	Range		M (SD)	Range		M (SD)	Range		p
Age (years)		20.61 (2.43)	18-29	-	23.34 (4.26)	18-40	-	21.81 (3.61)	18-40	-	<0.001
Height (cm)		173.22 (10.54)	149-190	-	172.14 (10.31)	155-198	-	172.74 (10.40)	149-198	-	ns
Weight (kg)		73.84 (17.95)	52-149	-	74.62 (25.47)	44-172	-	74.19 (21.53)	44-172	-	ns
Personal BJW		29.91 (4.74)	15-38	0.78	30.00 (4.75)	19-40	0.76	29.95 (4.72)	15-40	0.77	ns
General BJW		20.89 (5.47)	7-31	0.80	20.10 (4.99)	10-31	0.78	20.54 (5.26)	7-31	0.79	ns
											
CPT pain (secs)											
T1 Tolerance 		74.00 (77.74)	13-240	-	71.64 (78.50)	5-240	-	72.96 (77.74)	5-240	-	ns
T2 Tolerance 		68.94 (72.82)	12-240	-	73.87 (82.18)	6-240	-	71.10 (76.75)	6-240	-	ns
											
T1 Threshold		17.09 (10.87)	5-48	-	14.68 (10.99)	3-47	-	16.04 (10.94)	3-48	-	ns
T2 Threshold		17.44 (13.05)	5-63	-	14.66 (9.72)	2-45	-	16.22 (11.74)	2-63	-	ns
											
T1 Sensitivity		56.91 (74.81)	3-230	-	56.96 (75.03)	1-233	-	56.93 (74.58)	1-233	-	ns





		Injustice condition (n = 64)		Control condition (n = 50)		Total			
		M (SD)	Range		M (SD)	Range		M (SD)	Range		p
Reported Pain (SF-MPQ)											
T1 Sensory		13.34 (5.51)	3-26	0.73	14.02 (5.17)	6-28	0.64	13.64 (5.35)	3-28	0.69	ns
T2 Sensory		14.83 (6.88)	2-33	0.85	14.82 (6.20)	2-29	0.80	14.82 (6.56)	2-33	0.83	ns
											
T1 VAS		53.88 (18.14)	2-85	-	58.90 (18.12)	15-95	-	56.08 (1.82)	2-95	-	ns
T2 VAS		59.50 (21.83)	2-91	-	60.42 (19.98)	10-93	-	59.90 (20.95)	2-93	-	ns
											
State Anxiety											
Baseline State Anxiety		10.20 (3.01)	6-19	0.74	10.70 (3.57)	6-21	0.87	10.42 (3.26)	6-21	0.81	ns
T1 State Anxiety		11.03 (3.22)	6-17	0.77	12.02 (2.99)	6-19	0.70	11.46 (3.15)	6-19	0.74	ns










Table 2.  Relationships among variables at Time 1











* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001





Table 3.  Relationships among variables at Time 2







T2 SF-MPQ Sensory 	-.06	-.04	.17	-.23*	-.04	-.26**		
T2 SF-MPQ VAS	.06	.02	.06	-.32***	-.05	-.35***	.48***	
T2 State Anxiety	-.06	-.06	.01	-.21*	-.13	-.22*	.35***	.30***
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
BJW = Belief in a just world; Tolerance = length of time immersed; Threshold = point of reporting just noticeable pain; Sensitivity = range generated by subtracting the threshold from tolerance; SF-MPQ = Short Form, McGill Pain Questionnaire






